Abstract: We i n v estigate how bank competition a ects the e ciency of credit allocation, using a model of spatial competition. Our analysis shows that bad loans are more likely the larger the number of banks competing for customers. We study further how many banks will be active if market entry is not regulated. Free entry can induce too much entry and thus too many bad loans compared to the social optimum. Finally, we analyze how bank competition a ects the rms' restructuring e ort. We nd that restructuring has positive externalities which give rise to multiple equilibria, with either much or little restructuring activity.
Introduction
The recent nancial crisis in Russia has highlighted once more how much the economic prosperity of transition economies depends on a sound and well developed banking system. Over the last decade all countries in Eastern Europe have made attempts to restructure their banking sector. Previously state owned banks were split up, some of them privatized, new private banks have been set up. Looking at these countries more closely, three interesting observations can be made see section 2.
In this paper we suggest one possible explanation for these observations, and argue how they may be related to each other. For this purpose, we i n v estigate how banking competition a ects the e ciency of credit allocation and how the market structure of the banking sector evolves endogenously if entry is not regulated. Furthermore, we study what implications the nancial system has for the progress of enterprise restructuring. Our analysis suggests that bad loans are more likely the larger the number of banks active in the market. Free entry in turn results in too many banks entering the market which give rise to the bad loans problem. On the other hand, free entry lowers credit costs which has a positive impact on enterprise restructuring. The problem is, however, that through the nancial system restructuring has positive externalities which implies that countries can be stuck in a bad equilibrium with too little restructuring if everyone is pessimistic about the restructuring activity of other enterprises.
What makes banks so crucial for the nancing of new investments and hence the restructuring e ort of rms in transition economies? It is well known that in Western industrialized countries rms rely mostly on retained earnings to nance their investments 70 percent, and only to a much smaller extent on bank loans 25 percent, while trade credits, bond issues and equity issues play an even smaller role Mayer, 1988 . The problem in Eastern Europe is, however, that rms have not accumulated enough pro ts to rely on internal nancing. Furthermore, institutions like stock markets and bond markets are not su ciently developed to play a major role. This makes outside-nancing by banks the only viable alternative.
Banks, however, face an adverse selection problem since they have less information about the pro tability of investment projects than the manager of the rm applying for a credit. Given this problem, they can either engage in an arm's length relationship with their customers and protect their credits with collaterals. Alternatively, they can enter a control-oriented relationship and screen and control the rm they nance. In transition economies, the rst alternative is problematic. Although loans are often collateralized, this does not have much meaning because of the legal and practical di culties of taking possession of collateral goods in case of default. Furthermore, markets for collateral goods are very illiquid due to strong insider-control Bergl of 1995, Fan, Lee and Scha er 1996, Belyanova and Rozinsky 1995. This implies that control-oriented nancing must be the prominent mode of nancing rms in transition economies.
The existing theoretical literature on bank competition is mainly concerned with the question what impact nancial market liberalization has on the stability of the banking sector. In Matutes and Vives 1996, banks compete for deposits. In this model, the probability of bank failure increases with the degree of rivalry because of the lower pro t margins banks can obtain which implies a negative impact of bank competition on social welfare. A similar e ect can be observed in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz 1998 . They study a dynamic model in which competition for deposits erodes pro ts and thus promotes gambling in the banking sector because the ongoing concern value of the banks is lower. The problem here is that an increase in competition has little impact on the total amount of deposits, but mainly increases market stealing incentives.
Besanko and Thakor 1993 analyze the impact of competition in case of relationship banking. In their model, banks accumulate proprietary borrower-speci c information through the relationship with their clients. This gives rise to information rents. If these rents are shared between bank and borrower both bene t from this relationship. More competition reduces rates for borrowers. But this also makes banks take on more risk and thus jeopardizes the bank-customer relationship. This is why restricting entry is not only good for stability but may also make borrowers better o . Dell'Ariccia 1998 studies how the market structure of the banking sector evolves endogenously if market entry is not regulated. Like Besanko and Thakor, he considers the case where banks acquire proprietary information about their clients by lending to them. This gives existing banks an advantage over new entrants. Dell'Ariccia shows that even in the absence of exogenous xed costs of entry only a nite number of banks enter due to adverse selection problems.
In both Besanko and Thakor and Dell'Ariccia, banks acquire information about their customers in the course of their lending relationship. This is di erent in Broecker 1990 and Riordan 1993 where banks acquire information about potential customers before entering a relationship with them. Broecker analyzes a competitive credit market where banks compete in prices and receive costless independent binary signals about the creditworthiness of a potential creditor. He shows that the number of bad loans provided increases with the number of banks which has a negative impact on the average credit-worthiness. Riordan considers a similar model where banks compete for customers whose projects generate uncertain returns. Each bank receives a costless continuous signal about the pro tability of the investment project. In his model an increase in the number of banks has two e ects. It increases the number of signals observed but it also increases the number of bad loans provided which can reduce social welfare. Furthermore, more competition makes the winner's curse problem more severe which induces banks to adopt a more conservative rule for loan approval. This greater conservativeness can also result in a signi cant w elfare reduction.
The problem with the papers by Broecker and Riordan is that they assume that signals are costlessly available. However, if one takes into account that information acquisition is costly the interesting question arises how competition a ects the banks' incentive to invest in screening potential clients. A rst attempt to study this problem has been made in a companion paper Schnitzer 1998 where we compare the screening incentives of banks in two extreme competitive scenarios, one with a monopolistic bank and one with duopolistic Bertrand competition, where banks o er homogenous goods. In the companion paper we show that the incentive of a competitive bank can beas high as that of a monopolistic bank, but that in general the credit allocation under Bertrand competition is less e cient than in case of a monopolistic bank because it is more likely that bad loans are given. On the other hand, we nd that competition in the banking sector can have a positive impact on the rms' restructuring incentives because lower credit rates allow them to keep a larger share of the surplus to be generated.
In this paper we study a more general framework with spatial bank competition. In this model, rms need credits for an investment project with uncertain return. Banks are located equidistantly around a circular road and compete in prices for customers. Before making price o ers, each bank can investigate the pro tability of the rms' projects to avoid the risk of giving bad loans. One advantage of this model with spatial competition is that it allows us to avoid the extreme results of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products. Another advantage is that it provides us with a suitable framework to study the e ects of gradually changing the number of banks and to endogenize the number of banks active in the market. This allows us to study how the market structure of the banking sector evolves if entry is not regulated. Finally, in contrast to our companion paper, we assume that banks compete not just for one but for many rms. Thus, we can study the interaction of the rms' restructuring activity with the nancial system and with each other.
We start our analysis by asking how bank competition a ects the banks' incentive t o screen rms applying for a credit. A priori one might expect that more competition leads to lower expected pro ts and hence to lower incentives to invest in screening. Surprisingly, we nd that the incentive to screen does not depend on the number of competitors as such but rather on the numberof uninformed competitors. The more informed competitors, the larger the incentive to screen because the greater the risk to end up with bad loans. This pressure to screen can result even in ine ciently high screening activity. However, in general we observe that the larger the numberof competitors the more likely it becomes that in equilibrium banks give bad loans rather than to invest in screening.
Our next question is how the market structure of the banking sector evolves if market entry is not regulated. Interestingly, we nd that even in the absence of exogenous entry costs only a nite numberof banks can beactive in the market. The reason is that due to the information asymmetries banks have to incur some endogenous entry costs, either because they have to invest in screening or because they risk a loss due to bad loans. However, compared to the optimal numberof banks from a social welfare point of view, too many banks enter the market which can result in too little screening and hence too many bad loans being granted. This suggests that some entry regulation may b e useful.
Our third question concerns the restructuring e ort by enterprises. We model restructuring as some e ort taken by entrepreneurs to increase the pro tability of their investment projects. Naturally, e n trepreneurs engage in restructuring only if they expect a positive return on this activity. This return is the higher, the lower their cost of nancing their projects. For this reason, increasing bank competition has a positive impact on the restructuring e ort of rms. With free entry, h o w ever, the number of active banks depends on the overall restructuring activity of the economy, because the more restructuring takes place the more pro table are the investment projects and hence the more pro table is it to give loans. Consequently, more banks will enter the market. Thus, the restructuring activity of rms has a positive externality on the restructuring incentives of the other rms because it induces more bank entry and hence lower credit costs. This implies that we can have multiple equilibria, a good one with all rms restructuring and many banks entering the market and a bad one with no rm restructuring and less entry of banks. Here, some coordination may be needed to achieve the good equilibrium where much restructuring takes place.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a short overview of the restructuring of the banking sector in Eastern Europe. Section 3 introduces the model with spatial banking competition. In section 4 we study how banking competition a ects the total screening activity in the banking sector. Section 5 endogenizes the market structure of the banking sector and compares the unregulated market structure with the socially optimal one. In section 6 we include the restructuring e ort of rms and investigate the relationship of restructuring and the banking market structure. Section 7 concludes.
The banking sector in Eastern Europe
The Czech Republic introduced a two tier banking system in 1990. Since then it experienced a rapid expansion ot its banking sector. In 1995, there were 55 banks active Anderson and Kegels, 1998 . Although the Czech Republic is the only transition country that has successfully privatized substantial parts of its banking sector, the state still controls large parts of the banking activities. It holds a majority ownership of the three largest private banks which in turn dominate the market for deposits and credits, covering 75 of all private deposits of households and rms OECD, 1996.
Poland established a two-tier banking system in 1989, Hungary in 1997. In both countries, a large numberof new banks started to operate. However, many banks soon got into trouble, su ering from bad loans inherited from the socialist`monobank' and from defaults on new loans. Banks had little incentive to avoid giving bad loans, partly because they did not face a hard budget constraint. Poland recapitalized its commercial state banks once, in 1993, Hungary did so four times between 1991 and 1994 Baer and Gray, 1996. In 1995, 75 banks were active in Poland, and 42 in Hungary Anderson and Kegels. But, like in the Czech Republic, price competition is not very intensive because the banking sector is still dominated by the old state-controlled banks. Another problem is that markets are segmented regionally which sometimes leaves only two or three e ective competitors in one region Anderson and Kegels.
Russia restructured and corporatized its state banking system in the early 1990s. This process resulted in a fragmentation of the specialized banks. At the same time increasing numbers of independent, primarily small and poorly capitalized commercial banks emerged. By mid 1995, 2500 commercial banks were registered in Russia Fan et al.. In the meantime the strong growth of the banking sector is coming to an end because the minimum size of intitial statutory capital of newly registered banks was considerably increased. Furthermore, banks are now subject to more active supervision and may lose their licence if found to be in nancial distress Belyanova and Rozinsky. Despite the large number of banks, competition is not perceived as very intense and rms perceive the cost of loans as too high. On the other hand, banks su er from having granted bad loans and restructuring of rms is slow Fan et. al.. Bulgaria introduced a two tier system 1991. The liberalisation of the banking sector lead to a proliferation of commercial banks, since the legal framework allowed free entry and unchecked banking operations. In the meantime the Bulgarian National Bank has largely increased the minimum capital requirements. However, the entrance of new banks has not lead to increased price competition for loans or deposits. The competitive pressure has mainly resulted in more services and products being o ered OECD, 1997.
In Romania, a two tier system became operational in 1991. However, due to large capital requirements and rigorous licensing requirements, Romania experienced only mo-derate entry of new banks. On the other hand, banks are not regionally based as in some of the other countries, but cover wider geographical areas. State banks still dominate the banking sector. Lately, entry of new private banks, especially well-known international banks, has been encouraged OECD, 1997.
In almost all transition countries, foreign banks have not played a major role for bank competition yet and their numbers are still rather small. On the one hand they cannot rely on an extensive network of branches like the state-owned and formerly state-owened banks do. On the other hand, some countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have been reluctant to grant licences to foreign banks because they would like them to acquire small domestic banks instead of opening new subsidiaries. The most notable exception is Hungary, which has been more open to foreign banks Anderson and Kegels.
The picture that emerges from this overview is that most countries have experienced a large increase in the number of banks. On the other hand, many of these banks are having trouble with bad loans. However, price competition is not as intensive as the number of competitors suggests due to the fact that markets are still dominated by a few often state-controlled large banks.
The model
Consider a banking sector with n banks that are allocated equidistantly along a circular road of length 1. Banks compete for customers, i.e. rms that need loans. We assume that rms are uniformly distributed along the road. The total mass of rms is normalized to 1. Each rm has a potentially pro table investment opportunity which requires an investment of size i, i 0. The project can beeither goodin which case it generates a positive return v, v i , or it can bebad and generate a return of zero. The fraction of goodprojects is known to beq,0 q 1. To make the analysis interesting we assume parameter values to be such that the expected payo of nancing all projects is positive; i.e. qv,i 0. Firms and banks are run by risk-neutral owner-managers who maximize the pro ts of their enterprises. The time structure of the game is the following.
At stage 1, the banks can invest in a screening procedure. If a bank decides to do so it can learn at cost e which of the rms applying for a credit have goodprojects and which ones do not. The banks take this decision simultaneously and the information they receive is proprietary, i.e. there are no information spillovers.
2
At stage 2, the banks compete for customers by simultaneously setting prices z j , j = 1 ; :::; n. These prices specify the payment a rm has to make if the project generates a positive return v. In case of no returns no repayments are made. To keep our analysis as simple as possible we do not model competition on the market for deposits but take it as given that each bank has enough funds to nance the project. The main purpose of this assumption is to abstract from problems of capacity constraints. One possible interpretation would bethat banks can nance themselves unlimitedly at constant cost on the money market.
At stage 3, rms decide from which bank to take their credit. To avoid the extreme results of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products we assume that banks o er di erentiated products, represented by their location on the circular road. Good" rms, i.e. rms with goodprojects, condition their decision on the prices o ered by the banks and on their location. The idea is that they have preferences for a particular type of bank and that they incur some disutility by making business with a di erent type of bank. This is captured by a transportation" cost t proportional to the distance x to their bank. However, bad" rms, i.e. rms with bad projects, are indi erent at which prices loans are o ered since they are not going to repay the credit anyway. Without loss of generality w e assume that they do not care about the location of the bank either. The idea is that they do not count on an ongoing relationship with the bank and thus do not care about the particular characteristics of the bank they are dealing with. This implies the rm operates and gives su cient conditions for this relationship to be monotonic. An interesting extension would be to include the possibility of bankruptcy to see how this a ects the managers' incentives. Presently, h o w ever, the threat of liquidating rms or banks seems to be not very real.
2 It is straightforward to see that in case of information spillovers no bank would have an incentive t o engage in screening if it expected other banks to do so. 3 The recent theoretical literature on banks as nancial intermediaries suggests that the competitive structure of the credit market depends on the outcome of the banks' competition for deposits Yanelle, 1997 . However, in many transition economies banks do not actively compete for deposits but rely instead on central bank money or the money market. Belyanova and Rozinsky e.g. report that in Russia competition for depositors was for a long time negligible. Even now new commercial banks struggle with the problem that they still lack the facilities to deal with a large number of depositors. Thus, it seems justi ed to neglect this competition for deposits in our context. that all uninformed banks share bad loans equally. 4 At the end of this stage, returns are realized and payments are made, if possible. Note that the costs that arise from giving credits to bad rms enter the bank's pro t function as xed costs, i.e. do not depend on the price choice of the monopolist. This is due to the fact that bad rms need not care about the price since they are not going to pay it anyway. It is a standard exercise to calculate the monopolist's optimal prices and pro ts. If the value of the investment project is high, i. Note that the monopolist has rst-best incentives to invest in screening since he bears the full cost of acquiring information in case of screening and the full cost of misallocating credits in case of no screening. Thus, he fully internalizes the social cost of misallocating credits. In the following we restrict attention to parameter cases where 5 holds, i.e. it is e cient to invest in screening.
Consider now the situation where n 1 banks are present, making price o ers z j , j = 1; :::; n. Recall that good rms choose the bank o ering the lowest price, including transportation cost. Thus, given z j and z j+1 , bank j and j + 1 share the demand of good rms located between the two, which is q 1 n , as follows. Bank j serves a number of qx rms, where x denotes the marginal rm, characterized by the following equation z j + tx = z j+1 + t 1 n , x ! x = z j+1 , z j 2t + 1 2n 6
Bad rms are indi erent which of those banks willing to o er a credit to choose. Of course, a bank that has invested in screening never o ers a credit to bad rms. Thus, as indicated above, the demand of bad rms is shared equally by all uninformed banks since they are willing to give a loan to all rms applying for a credit.
To determine the symmetric price equilibrium consider the pro t function of bank j, given symmetric price o ers z by all other banks. If bank j did not invest in screening, but m other banks have done so, where 0 m n , bank j's pro t is equal to j = qz j , i2x Note that the number of informed banks m and the screening decision of bank j a ect only the xed cost term in the pro t functions above. This implies that the price equilibrium is una ected by the ex ante screening decision of the banks.
6
It is straightforward to determine the symmetric price equilibrium to be z 1 = ::: = z n = t n + i 9 provided transaction costs are high enough so that all banks make non-negative pro ts.
In the following we assume v to be su ciently large such that v 3t 4 + i. This guarantees that the price equilibrium just described is indeed the right equilibrium for any n 2, because the whole market is covered given these prices. For a given numberof informed banks, m, the resulting equilibrium pro ts for informed banks are tq n 2 , e 10 whereas the pro ts for uninformed banks are tq n 2 , 1 n , m 1 , qi 11
Note that the larger the number of informed banks the smaller the pro t of the remaining uninformed banks because the greater the share of bad rms they attract. This suggests that the incentive t o i n v est in screening increases in the number of informed banks. This is con rmed by the following proposition.
6 A straightforward extension of our analysis would be to study how price competition would be a ected if bad rms were not indi erent from which bank to take the loan. Suppose bad projects had some positive probability of generating positive returns. In this case bad rms would care about the price o ered by banks because they would expect to pay the price with positive probability. This would induce uninformed banks to be more conservative with their price o ers because a lower price o er would attract not just more good risks but also more bad risks. Consequently, we would obtain asymmetric price equilibria, with informed banks o ering lower, uninformed banks o ering higher prices.
Proposition 1 Suppose transportation costs are large enough such that tq n 2 e . ii If e 1 n 1 ,qi, then there exist two pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, one in which all banks invest in screening and one in which no bank invests in screening. The no-screening equilibrium Pareto-dominates the screening equilibrium since the screening cost outweigh the potential loss due to nancing bad projects.
Proof: See Appendix. Surprisingly, the incentive to screen does not depend on the numberof competitors, but rather on the numberof uninformed competitors. The smaller the numberof uninformed banks, the larger the incentive to invest in screening oneself. If a bank expects all other banks to engage in screening, it has rst best screening incentives because it risks to serve all bad rms in case of no screening. The resulting screening equilibrium, however, implies an ine cient duplication of screening costs. As long as ne 1,qi, this screening equilibrium is preferable to a situation without screening, despite the duplication of screening cost. Interestingly, in this parameter case it is also the only equilibrium.
If instead ne 1 , qi, the losses due to bad credits do not justify this duplication of screening costs and indeed in this case there exists a no-screening equilibrium which pareto-dominates the screening equilibrium.
5 Market entry and market structure of the banking sector
In this section we investigate how the market structure in the banking sector evolves if market entry is not regulated. We study furthermore, how this free-entry market structure 7 Proposition 1 characterizes equilibria only for transportation cost t large enough such that all banks can make non-negative pro ts if they invest in screening. If t were smaller it could no longer be an equilibrium that all banks invest in screening and make price o ers thereafter. In this case, there exist equilibria where banks use mixed strategies. Such cases are discussed extensively in Schnitzer 1998 for the duopoly case with homogenous goods. In the present paper we restrict attention to parameter cases that guarantee pure strategy equilibria.
can be judged from the point of view of social welfare and what conclusions we can draw for the need to regulate entry.
Consider rst the case of unregulated entry. In this case, the equilibrium number of banks entering the market is determined by the zero pro t condition ignoring integer problems. Pro ts in turn depend on the banks' expectation whether or not to engage in screening after entering the market. An interesting question is whether or not there exist multiple entry equilibria for a given set of parameters, one in which only few banks enter and screen and one in which many banks enter and do not screen. This question is answered by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 i Suppose e i1,q 2 tq . Then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in whichn = q tq e banks enter the market and all of them invest in screening.
ii Suppose e i 1,q 2 tq . Then there exist two pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, one in whichñ = tq i1,q banks enter the market and no bank invests in screening and one in whichn = q tq e ñ banks enter the market and all invest in screening.
In this case the screening equilibrium is Pareto-dominated b y the no-screening equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
An interesting observation is that market entry is nite even though there exist no exogenous entry cost. Thus, we do not have the fragmentation result that typically arises in this kind of spatial competition models with zero entry cost. The reason for our result is that even though there exist no exogenous entry cost banks have to incur some endogenous entry cost. A bank considering entry expects to either invest in screening at cost e or to su er losses from bad projects. In the latter case of a no-screening equilibrium each bank serves 1=n of the good rms and 1=n of the bad rms. As n increases both shares shrink in the same way. But in addition, the equilibrium price paid by good rms, t n + i, decreases. Thus, although the cost arising from loss making credits decreases as the number of banks increases, total pro ts decrease even more. This is why there exists only a nite number of banks for which a bank can guarantee itself nonnegative pro ts.
The larger t, which measures the degree of product di erentiation, the larger q, the ratio of good rms, and the smaller the investment cost i, the more banks will enter and the less likely it is that banks e ciently engage in screening. Instead, banks share the risk of attracting bad rms. However, if banks expect that all other banks engage in screening, only few banks enter and end up in a Pareto-dominated screening equilibrium. This is bad for prices which are important for restructuring incentives to be discussed below and it implies a waste of resources.
Smaller values of t instead make it more likely that few banks enter and e ciently engage in screening. The lower degree of product di erentiation implies that banks compete more aggressively which leads to lower prices. This is why less banks enter the market.
What would be the socially optimal number of banks? Are there circumstances where the number of entrants should be restricted? This question is subject of the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 i Suppose e i1,q 2 tq . Then the socially optimal number of banks isn = 1 2 q tq e which induces a screening equilibrium at stage 1. Note thatn n = q tq e , the unique free-entry equilibrium number of banks for this parameter case, which also gives rise to a screening equilibrium.
ii Suppose i1,q 2 tq e 25 16 i1,q 2 tq . Then the socially optimal number of banks isn = 1 2 q tq e which induces a screening equilibrium at stage 1. Note thatn ñ = tq i1,q , the Pareto-dominant free-entry equilibrium number of banks for this parameter case, which induces a no-screening equilibrium.
iii Suppose 25 16 i1,q 2 tq e . Then the socially optimal number of banks isñ = tq i1,q = n , the Pareto-dominant free-entry equilibrium number of banks for this parameter case, which induces a no-screening equilibrium.
Proposition 3 suggests that unregulated entry may result in too many banks entering the market. In case i, for low v alues of screening cost e, too many banks enter the market and waste resources because of too much screening activity. In case ii, for intermediate values of e, free entry prevents screening altogether whereas it would be better to restrict entry and thus encourage screening. Only for very high levels of screening cost a social planner would not want to encourage screening either. In this case the best that can happen is to have a s m a n y banks as possible to bene t from product diversity, subject to the constraint that all banks make non-negative pro ts. The results indicate the potential dangers of unregulated entry. Only if screening costs are very high and thus a screening equilibrium is not likely anyway, unregulated entry is optimal. However, as screening costs get lower over time, it is important to regulate market entry because otherwise too many banks are active which do not engage in screening.
6 Bank competition and enterprise restructuring
In this section we w ant to endogenize the number of good rms by i n v estigating the managers' incentive to restructure their rms. To x ideas consider the following restructuring technology. Suppose each manager can in uence the likelihood of having a goodproject by investing some e ort in restructuring. If the manager invests r, the probability of the project to turn out good is q, otherwise it is q, with, and qv,r qv. By the law of large numbers, the total share of rms with good projects is q if all rms invest in restructuring, and it is q if no rm invests in restructuring.
Suppose banks can observe the restructuring e orts of rms but cannot judge which of the rms have been successful in restructuring. What is then the incentive of an individual manager to engage in restructuring? Of course, this incentive depends on the expected payo of the rm in case the project turns out to be good. This in turn depends on the expected price to bepaid for the credit and thus on the expected competition in the banking sector. Recall that market entry and hence competition in the banking sector depends on the share of good rms in the economy. Of course, the restructuring decision of the individual manager does not a ect this share since each rm is in nitesimaly small. However each rm's restructuring incentive is a ected by the restructuring e ort of the other rms. In this sense, each rm's restructuring decision imposes a positive externality on the other rms because it a ects the pro tability of the banking sector. The following Proposition characterizes the resulting restructuring equilibrium.
Before we state this Proposition, we need some further notation. Let z e q = t n e q + i denote the expected equilibrium price if all rms restructure and hence entry of n e q banks is expected. Similarly, let z e q = t n e q + i denote the expected equilibrium price if no rm restructures and hence entry of n e q banks is expected. The precise values of z e q and z e q for di erent parameter cases are given in the Appendix, in the Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that in Proposition 2 we have seen that n increases in q. This implies that nq n q , as is shown formally in the Appendix. Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 indicates that for intermediate values of restructuring costs some coordination may be required to achieve the equilibrium where all rms restructure. Otherwise, the economy m a y su er from too little restructuring activity simply because everybody expects the others not to restructure either.
Conclusion
We h a v e started this paper with three observations about transition economies in Eastern Europe. How can we interpret them in the light of our theoretical analysis? The rst two observations concerned the huge increase in the number of banks and the problem that many of these banks su er from bad loans. Our preceding analysis suggests that unregulated entry results in too many banks entering the market. Unless screening costs are rather low, which is unlikely to be the case in Eastern Europe, this entry behavior in turn induces banks to take the risk of giving bad loans rather than to invest in screening. It is worth emphasizing that this result of our model obtains even though banks have to bear the full losses associated with bad loans. Naturally, their incentive to engage in screening and sort out good risks from bad risks is even lower if banks face a soft budget constraint, as is the case in many countries.
Prima facie, our third observation about the low restructuring activity seems to be more of a puzzle. One should expect that the large number of banks gives rise to intensive price competition and that low credit costs stimulate rms to engage in restructuring. We suggest two reasons why this is not case. First of all, even though the numberof banks increased a lot it is widely perceived that price competition is not very intensive. In section 2 we reported that in most countries the banking sector is still dominated by a small numberof large banks, which are often state-controlled. Thus, it is not surprising that rms report high credit costs as one of the main reasons for not investing Fan et al.. But our analysis also points to another potential problem. Total restructuring activity has an impact on the pro tability of the banking sector. This interaction of restructuring activity and nancial system implies that restructuring has positive externalities. Thus, if all rms are pessimistic about the activity of other rms the economy can get stuck in a bad equilibrium where no one restructures because everyone expects that no one restructures. If this is the case, it may beuseful to design some policy which increases the incentive to restructure exogenously in order to improve expectations and thus helps to switch to the good equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose banks expect a screening equilibrium. Then the equilibrium numberof banks is determined by the following zero pro t condition.
tq social welfare is maximized withñ banks which induces a no-screening equilibrium. Note that this condition is consistent with 28.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider a manager's decision whether or not to spend r on restructuring. He will do so if and only if qv , z e , r q v , z e ! q , q v , z e r 30 where z e = t n e + i is the price he expects to pay for the credit. Note that this price depends on the number of banks, n e , expected to enter the market which in turn depends on the restructuring decision of all other banks. In this proof we restrict attention to Pareto-dominant e n try equilibria. However, it is straightforward to extend the proof and include Pareto-dominated entry equilibria as well. In this case the exact boundaries of our parameter ranges change but not the structure of the results. 
